Commentary: China’s lack of disclosure over ICBM test works against its own strategic interests

SINGAPORE: China’s rare intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) test last month in the South Pacific – its first in 44 years – has raised questions over Beijing’s strategic ambitions.
The sudden announcement on Sep 25 by China’s defence ministry came less than two hours after the launch of the ICBM at 8.44am from Hainan. It was reported by Chinese state media as having met the objective when the missile “fell into expected sea areas”.
Although not indicated explicitly, media reports in French Polynesia indicated the projectile landed near the territory’s economic zone.
Having travelled more than 11,000km from its launch site – double the 5,500km range of the most basic ICBMs – the offending object, likely the Dong Feng-31AG (DF-31AG), was loaded with a dummy warhead rather than the 1-megaton fissile material this type of missile is designed to carry.
If the ICBM in question was indeed a variant of the DF-31 – which first entered service almost two decades ago – as opposed to the newer, more advanced DF-41, the decision to fire the older (meaning it is more stable), but nevertheless potent, weapon can perhaps be interpreted as Beijing prioritising a more reliable means to signal its martial prowess to the United States and its allies in the Indo-Pacific.
As well as claiming the test was “routine” and not directed at any country, Beijing was lauded by some US officials for giving the Pentagon advance notice to avert misperception and miscalculation.
France, Australia and New Zealand have also said that they were given advance notification of the test. Accordingly, the information would have been conveyed by some of them to their counterparts in the region as well as relevant authorities operating in those waters and airspace. At the same time, Japan and the Philippines were alerted a few days prior to the launch of possible “space debris” landing at sea, although it is unclear if they were directly informed about the ICBM test.
Still, not everyone who believe they had a right to know was impressed. For one, the president of Kiribati criticised the Chinese government for neglecting to inform the Pacific Island state, and further alluded to the test as a threat to “world peace and stability”. In response, China’s embassy there stated “there was no need to alert Kiribati” since the test targeted no one in that part of the world.
The relative dearth of advance strategic messaging in this episode is in stark contrast to the previous time the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) fired an ICBM into the Pacific Ocean.
In order to grasp the circumstances behind the latter, one needs to go back to a time when China had just emerged from the excesses of Mao Zedong’s Cultural Revolution as his successors sought to reintegrate the country with the global economy.
The genesis of the decision by China to develop its own ballistic missile programme began in March 1965, which it named the Dong Feng (or East Wind) project.
Under the auspices of the then Seventh Ministry of Machinery Industry directed by the regime’s top military leadership, it was recommended that four different types of surface-to-surface missiles were to be developed from 1965 to 1972: The DF-2, DF-3, DF-4 and DF-5.
However, this so-called “Eight Years, Four Bombs” proposal was ultimately set back by the Cultural Revolution, and it would take an additional eight years until May 1980 before the final test of the last missile, the DF-5 – China’s first ICBM – was completed.
To be sure, the decision to conduct the test was made in September 1977, but it required a few more years for China’s National Defence Science and Technology Commission to formulate and coordinate the work plans necessary to effect a successful test.
Those due processes included: Determining the test ranges, finalising the engineering and land mapping, securing sea lines of communications, meteorological and hydrological analyses, aviation security as well as constructing a base for its 18-strong naval taskforce of Yuanwang survey ships and other escort vessels.
After having decided the Jiuquan Test Centre as the launch site and identifying “the high seas of the Pacific Ocean” as the endpoint of the DF-5, Xinhua News Agency went as far as announcing the coordinates (7°00’ South, 171°33’ East) on May 9, 1980, adding that the event was to take place sometime between May 12 and Jun 10.
In line with the information, the DF-5 was launched at 10am on May 18 and dropped within a 70-nautical mile radius in the waters surrounded by the Pacific Island nations of Nauru, the Solomon Islands, Tuvalu and Vanuatu.
Not unlike the world’s other superpowers, China has the legitimate right to develop its military capabilities as its national power increases. As it is, the PLA has conducted more ICBM tests in China’s inland areas. Nevertheless, the recent test in the South Pacific allows it to measure the performance of its equipment along a more realistic trajectory, although it does so at some reputational cost since it may play into the hands of what the ruling Chinese Communist Party sometimes labels “external forces” – including those entities that purportedly play up the China threat.
Whether it was a careless slip by Chinese defence planners, or genuine disregard for the sensitivities of its lesser international counterparts on Beijing’s part that resulted in the non-disclosure of the ICBM test to some regional countries prior to launch, China’s current status in the world order means that its leaders cannot expect their words and deeds to go unnoticed.
Whereas its ICBM test in 1980 generated little attention given how China then was still actively reaching out to the world’s developed economies for foreign investment and know-how to kickstart its reform and opening-up policy, China in the 21st century contributes substantially to the global gross domestic product (GDP). Militarily and technologically, it is also regarded by Washington as the only other superpower capable of mounting a systemic challenge to the US’ number one position.
As it is, the lack of strategic messaging by Beijing in 2024 to caution all concerned parties at the receiving end of its missile launch represents a missed opportunity.
As much as China the superpower has steadfastly sought to project an image of a benign hegemon, whether its interlocutors buy into it is another matter. Obviously, only Beijing can speak for itself as to why it failed to disclose its strategic objective this time when there seemed little national security risk at stake.
Further neglect in China’s strategic messaging leaves open the possibility for others to fill in the gaps – or worse, mischaracterise its actual intent.
James Char is Assistant Professor with the China Programme and Deputy Coordinator of the Master of Science (Asian Studies) programme at the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.